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The term development usually comes adorned with an epithet. 
Its main purpose is clarification. In addition, it may occasionally 
serve to placate sensitivities. In the course of time, a number of 
epithets have been adopted and several of these have subsequently 
been abandonedo Their useful life varies in duration; there is some 
turn-over. One of the earliest epithets, if not the earliest, is 
"technological". It has by and large been discarded for reasons of 
manifest inadequacy; but it. lingers on in the term technical assis-
. tance.o This remains widely used: in a meaning considerably vaguer 
than the words proper would suggest. In retrospect, it does' not .ap-
pear that the term was dropped because it was a ~s pro toto ex-
pression~ this kind of expression is freely used all the time .• Rather, 
it must have been that the pars selected for the purpose turned out 
to be an unfortunate choice. Technology transplanted will hardly 
work miracles. Indeed, as A.J. Toynbee has lost no time to point out3, 
it may wreak havoc. 
Then came the term "economic development". To some, it is yet 
another pars pro toto, perhaps somewhat more adroitly chosen. To· 
others, including many respected economists, it comes near to being, 
or actually is, a full, adequate description. This difference in ap-
preciations is important; we shall return to it. 
Subsequently, some more epithets of the pars pro toto variety 
have come into use, such as political development. others have been 
adopted :that were decidedly partial, segmentary indications. Examples 
are administrative, agricultural, educational development, and the like. 
Whereas the pars pro toto variety tends to refer to development as pro-
cess, the sectorial variety is more geared to envisaging development 
as action. 
Returning to the former variant, a naturel q'uestion to arise is 
whether after economic and political, E 0 social has been adopted as 
an epithet. Indeed it has, but not in a manner that would put it on 
. . 
a par with the ot~er two. In connoting community development or so-
cial welfare (or security) policies, it features in the list of 
sectorial rather than of Ears, ,Pro totq, indicatj.ons. This seems to 
preclude the use of the adjective social along with economic and po-
li tical, asa J?ars pro to.!£. epithet -to development. vJere a third ad-
jective required to continue the series, it might be necessary to 
resort to a slightly awkward term like societaL The intriguing 
q,~estion, crucial to this paper, is what societal would mean, if 
related to development. 
It is propol3ed'to approach this question by a circuitous route. 
Our access to it will be from a point that was shunted aside tempora= 
rily in the preceding: "economic" as a, }2§!§....pro i2.1£ or rather as a 
"full" description •. Is it right to rely on a part, however salient, 
to convey the whole that is to be con.ceptualized? Could "development" 
and "economic development" be ra-t;ed synonymous f interchangeable expres-
sions? Thus phrased, the problem sounds formal; upon closer inspection 
however it appears as a mat·ter of profound epistemology rather than of 7 
simply, formal logico This may explain wh;y few people indulge in such 
closer inspection~ As often 1:3,.S not, a considerably more down-to-earth 
reasoning is adhered. to. It says that to him for I-Jhom the fulness of 
life is economic, the answer is yes and that for anyone else it is 
no. This wouldnoi. be saying much, bui; for the coincidenoe thai:; there 
exists such a thin!?, as an economic philosophy of lj fe. (Philosophy, 
by the way, that is as hard to identify as an iceberg; but Marxism 
is its visible top,.) ])ue to this philosophy = no doubt in conjunction 
with other factors -, the prevailing perception of development) even 
,'., 
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amongst leading minds, .is based on the assumption that it is mostly, 
primarily or even wholly eoonomio development. 
Illustrations abound, and they add up to demonstrate the formi-
dable influenoe of those holding on to this prise de position& Not 
so long ago, one of the leading development eoonomists asserted pri-
vately that development is a matter of every aspeot of life; less 
than a week later he went on reoord publioly asserting that eoonomio 
theory, in dealing with development, has improved to the point where 
it can aocount for any relevant non-economic considerations. The fa-
mous Pearson Report4, one of the more influential amongst the weighty 
reports with which important agenoies have heralded the Seoond Develop-
ment Decade, is a brilliantly one-sided presentation of development: 
not so much because it stresses aid rather than self-help but because 
i-t. offers a -probably unsurpassed - representation of the economic-
financial pars pro toto~ The United Nations, in sponsoring the Second 
Development Decade, have taken a position v by means of two subsequent 
resolutions5 , according to which economic development is the one con-
cern in considering matters of development a.nd development aid. 
In view of all this it is an act of boundless temerity but, I 
submit, also of intellectual honesty to hoist the warning signal. The 
exclusive stress on the economic aspect or dimension of development 
is open to challengeo It is so for reasons of pure epistemology. 
1~ese should perhaps not detain the present argument. It is so again 
for at least two more immediately significant reasonso One, it is 
1ftJestern-ethnocentric, and this in a manner that is rapidly becoming 
obsoleteo ~wo, it misreads the signs in most if not all underdevel-
opment situations. 
As to the former point, the alleged primacy of eoonomics in 
. 6 life is typical of a period in western history of which we are wit-
nassing -the endo In its upsurge it was marked by the industrial revo-
lution and by "{rJ'ork as a. (if not ~) prime moral value ; its end appears 
to ensue from instant med.iated communication and a.utomatione The younger 
generation of the westy whether rebellious or not, ha.ve no real use 
for the primacy of economics, that is the egocentrically or ethnocen-
trically understood. maximization of re·turns upon efforto It follows 
that the primacy of economics is a tenet typical of a certain time 
and place 0 Any claim as to its general or fundal1lental validity needs 
to be substantiatedv It canno-t he assumed.; but this is precisely 
what is generally doneo Hence the challenge 0 
As to the second point, it is often remarked that the rising 
ti(le of expectations in the developing areas has basically one motif 
only, namely the d.esire for abundance in a strictly down-to-earth, 
material sensee As an obse::r"ra-tion of fact, this sounds disarmingly 
correct~ (But note the extremes of idealist response it will often 
eli.dt amongs~t certai.n groups in developed, areas ~ an intriguing 
counterpoint~) It would, howe~Terp be a· sad and 'by no means innocent' 
mistake to follow this observation through with the often heard 
statement that thus the uneq:ui.V'ooal demand is for economic develop-
ment. To warrant such a conolusion i·t is necessary to assume (1) 
that those concerned ca.n and will distinguish bet"reen their actual 
dismal state, called underdevelopment~ and a desired, almost dream-
like, state of ma.terial bliss~ and. again. (2) that they will subse-
quently interpolate, between the two, economic development as the 
link (both conceptually and in terms of effort) to bridge the gape 
For such a oonclusion, no firm base is avaHable in existing evi= 
dence~ Other conclusions, a.ll equally tentative, are also possible. 
One of these would be that (~lite a few of t.hose concerned desire7, 
simply, to strike it rioh~ for a. ohange. Amongst this range ofpos-
sible conclusions v the one about economic development is in fact UXl.= 
likely to prove more probable than otherso It is complex and sophisti-
cated to such an extent that questions are bound to arise whether it 
can fit the thought and action patterns obtaining in many underdevel= 
oped areaso There is no traoe of doubt that questions of this l'l.ature 
do crop up in the practice of economic developmento Still v it is on 
rare occasions only tha·t one hears them voicedo Hence v once more, the 
challenge 0 This kind of questions needs to be pursued systematically v 
even if it means to take time out from urgent actiono 
On the strength of these two pOints, it a.ppears virtually im= 
possible to bring proof for the thesis the .. t development would be 
synonymous with economic developmento Rather» they suggest that devel-
opment» if anything» is not merely economic development8o To some9 
·this suggestion comes a.s a disa.ppointment, as if someone tried to 
foroe an open ~ooro Surely v development economists will at times 
staunchly and perhaps narrowly uphold "economocra.tic" views as re= 
gards developmento But will they not, at other times, uphold a more 
liberal» if vaguer, comprehensive view as well? Some of them will 
indeed, but there is occasion to ask how much of such broad=min.ded-
ness would» in the last resort, have to be written off as a mere 
defense mechanism to safeguard the con'Unued pre-eminence of the eco= 
nomic d.iscipli.ne and. professic!lo (More so since F a.fter all, econcmics 
started. on. its .career as the universal social scien.ceo) Nor does the. 
real wea,kness of the suggestion just made re.side in what economists 
will have to say about ito It resides in a different circumstanceo 
Other disciplines have thus far contributed. little tha.t could support 
and effectu.ate the claim that development is more than economic devel-
opment and that it is by consequence a matter for multidisciplinary, 
if not interdisciplinar,yp concerno 
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In the meantime, so long as development remains the privileged 
domain of economists, bankers, entrepreneurs and management experts, 
it seems unrealistic to hope for better than relatively modest (by 
the yardstick of expectations and of recognized needs) and basically 
unpredictable results of development action. To state this does not 
in any sense constitute an effort to detract from what these experts 
have done: a fool who would attempt to do that. It is, simply, drawing 
the inevitable conclusion from the patent fact that the approach has 
been partial and one-sided to begin with. No need to add that this 
conclusion is disconcerting in more than one way. It also is alarming. 
The several milestones that mark the beginning of the Second Development 
Decade do not give confidence that in the regard now mentioned the les-
son of the First Decade has been learned. Perhaps it is still being 
learned, though. Between the lines of the two basic U.N. resolutions5, 
a good deal of vagueness and hesi tatj,on is apparent,_ lrlould it be pre-
posterous to interpret at least part of this as the sign of some holy 
dissatisfaction \iith current preco~lceived. ideas, and thus as a possi-
ble indicator of a search for a fresh and hopefully less stunted ap-
proach? 
The question nO,\"1 is, clearly, what are the implications of this 
view for sociology. Thus phrased, it restates the question that intro-
duced the long parenthesis on economic development: what about 
"societal" development? 
Basically, the position is perfectly clear. The field of devel-
opment I whather in terms of intellection ,or in tems of action, is in 
no "'lay pre-empted. Access to it is free: nobody is obliged to enter 
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on the terms of economics or on any other terms. There is no shortage 
of indications, perha.ps vague yet untn:LstaJr.abJ..e, that other social 
soiences besides economics have a calling to get into the acto Amongst 
these others; sociology is generally assumed to come first or second. 
At a first blush it could appear that, if all this constitutes 
a challenge to sociology, the response has been forthcoming without 
failo At the previous \'/orld Congress I at Evian, thousands of members 
of the profession showed at least a passive bu~ oftentimes an active 
interest in the matter. For a number of years now, there has been a 
rising tide of sociological publications on development and its count-
less aspects and problems. The subject is taught under various labels 
and from a number of sociological angels~ Time to congratulate ou~ 
selves? Not really. To those launching the Second Development Decade, 
development is still economic development. Sociology has not achieved 
a real impact. It has not made a real dent in the problem. Economists, 
still firmly in control, show concern, occasionally, about what they 
see as insufficient or ineffective sociologioal participation. It 
looks as if, in the matter of development, a statement applies that 
a leading member of the profession made, years ago, about something 
else: many departures, few arrivals. And for present purposes it is 
less important to know that some sociologists have arrived than to 
realize, and recognize, that soci.ology has not yet established itself 
as a major means for dealing with development. 
This state of affairs inspires two kinds of questioning. One 
refers to causes of the ~~derperformance - if that is what it is -
of sociology, and oonsequently to ways to eliminate drawbacks. The 
other refers to promising access roads for sociology into the field 
of deyelopmen"t. 
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Summed up in one sentence, the emergent concern with develop-
ment found economic's in a condition enabling it to face the challenge 
at short notice, but it caught sociology utterly unprepared. This state-
ment holds no praise for economics and no blame for socio10gyo 
Ever since the devastation of two world wars and the manifestly 
economic calamities in between, a large portion of the creative thin-
king of both theoretical and practising economists has been geared to 
conceptualizing the economy, and economics with.it, in such a manne; 
that they should prove manageable. When the concern with development 
emerged it was readily recognized by many economists as a new varia-
tion upon the known theme; and this is how it has been dealt with ever 
since. The sure grasp and the dexterity of manipulation demonstrated 
in the process have, on the whole, been so convincing that hardly any 
severe questioning could crop up concerning the validity of under-
lying assumptions. Development still features as merely a new varia-
tion upon th.e known theme; and the theme still features as universal, 
notwithstanding the recognition of a so-called widening gap between 
rich and poor nations. 
Not so in the case of sociology. Developments in the discipline 
have distantly parallelled the bifurcation between macro economics 
and business economics, except that either way the distinctive featu-
res have always been exclusively sociological. Moreover, that which 
features at the micro and of the spectrum is not one complex but rather 
two more or less counterpoised elements. One is the urge towards social 
action in various forms and in various - but always limited - frames 
of reference. The other is a more investigative, explanatory approach, 
of increasingly pBychologica~ colouring, which is~rongly backed by 
rapidly growing research techniques (based, in their turn, on various 
philosophical presuppositions of which the importance is usually hidden 
because they are taken for granted). Amidst these two diverging trends 
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there has been relatively little opportunity for the growth of theory 
geared to managing-social or societal situations of limited size. Devel-
opments at the macro end have been detemined to a considerable extent 
by the circumstance that sociologists have never achieved consensus 
about their definition of society. At no time have they - consciously 
or unconsciously - adopted a basic device towards the conceptualization 
/ 
of the reality or realities they proposed to deal with. (In more or 
less tacitly adopting price for their purpose, economists have not 
merely achieved a satisfactorily clear conceptualization of the econo-
my, but in addition a ready source of all-round - and what is more, 
quantifiable - information.) The outcome has been a proliferation of 
grand theoriesg awe-inspiring yet in the last resort gratuitous exer-
cises of the intellect that never leave a. doubt about the social-phi-
losophy origins of much sociological thinking. Each and ever,yone is 
doomed to remain speculative and classificator,yg a main source of frus-
tration to the oncoming generation, to whom man's instant and full 
control over his context is at once a matter of firm belief and of ago-
nizing horror. 
Either way, sociology has suffered - if not more than economics 
has, then certainly more noticeably - from two fundamental drawbacks, 
inherent in the very nature of its conceptualization and theor,y-con-
struction. One is ethnocentrism and the other is uncertain verifiabi-
lity. Together, these two constitute a fundamental problem of rel-
evance: not relevance in the absolutized, personal-emotional sense in 
which it is too often used nowadays, but in the sense of a demonstrable 
and if needs be manageable relationship between ideas and reality. 
As regards ethnocentrism: the plural composition of mankind is 
recognized but the peculiarities of each component tend to be envisaged 
as recurrent and regular rather ~han as discrete and uniqueo Thus, they 
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will to a considerable extent be extrapolated, one way or another, 
from one's own unit: whether society, economy or polity. It is a 
tell-ta.le circumstance, in this connection, that sociologists will 
perhaps - but rather not - be tempted into considering culture, but 
they will shy away, without fail, from cultures. 
As regards verifiability: in economics, the mutual relevance 
between reality and theory is supposed to be ensured by application 
of theory, ~ policy making, and research, conceived as two move-
ments of the mind in complementary dire.ctions. Again for lack of a : 
central denominator of society as his field of study, the sooiolo-
gist keeps running into difficulties relating to his own involvement 
in society. These preclude verifiability to such an extent that there 
is cause for c oncem9 • 
Referring once more to the bifurcation between the macro and 
micro approaches (or, as some say, levels), an additional observation 
is in order. Somehow suspended in the void between macro and micro, 
a handful of dedicated sociologists have occasionally tried to respond 
to an increasing awareness of dramatic changes all around. They have 
launched a specialism that for quite a while has carried the near-
stigma of being supererogatory: social changeo In so doing they were 
at a double handicap. vlliilst caught in the middle between micro and 
macro, they were yet quite separate from the more fashionable con-
cern with the middle range. At the same time they had to work con-
t d tt f t l ' t' th t d t 'ldy10 cep s an pa ems 0 concep ua ~za ~on a prove mos unw~e • 
The upshot was that when challenged to become involved with develop-
ment even these specialists in social change found, no doubt to their 
utter dismay, that they came in from the cold. Development was not a 
normal and natural extension to what they were already doing. It tux-
ned out to elude their grasp, conceptually and theoretically, and it 
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baffled them as a state of affairs requiring action. 
This brings to mind yet another basic feature of sociological 
thinking \,lhich, like ethnocentrism and uncertain verifiability, proves 
acutely problematic under present circumst~nces of rapid overall change 
and of development. rlhis is the presupposi ti,on of a. given societal _:' 
frame of reference: in the last resort a (more or less Platonic) ideal 
state of affairs, not really affected by time or circumstance. no 
doubt, both ethnocentrism and uncertain verifiability are each in its 
way symptoms of the same.syndrome. It is thi~ - always tacit - presup-
position that renders a good deal of sociological thinking (indeed the 
most influential part of it) a fundamentally adaptive proposition11 • 
Such variability and variety as sociology is called upon to explain 
is supposedly no more than a matter of variation upon a given (if 
not necessarily fully known) theme. Just think of the sociology of the 
melting pot, of the underlying philosophy of social work. And what ,; 
could be the sense of all the little pieces of research that the lead-
d.il·g; periodicals in the field will publish, virtually to the exclusion 
of everything else, if it could not be assumed that the apparently 
non-cumulative and thereby inconclusive nature of this stream of pu-
blications is not a real problem since its solu~ion is given a priori? 
However, assumptions like these are breaking d01ritl most alarmingly 
under current circumstances of adramatio shift in the manifest frame 
of referenoe for human sociooultural existenoe. If there e.xists such 
So thing as a sociological establishment, its main distinctive feature 
is no doubt its lack of readiness to sho\'/ concern about matters like 
these, which indeed affect nothing less than the foundations of the 
discipline. But it is a dangerous alarmist who will categorically 
see absence of concern where .he sees no show· of it. 
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All in all, a gloomy picture? For those vlho vlOuld like to belie-
ve that in regard to development, all is moonshine and roses in socio-
logy: gloomy indeed. \'/hen the concern with development emerged, socio-
logy was engaged elsewhere; and in attempting to change its course in 
order to come to grips with development it has suffered from the per-
fectly normal handicap of its own natural inertia. Those who have 
believed that, at Evian, the profession vias ready for the conference 
theme, were disappointed. On the other hand those who have seen the 
Evian theme as ~ viable means to provide the profession with a needed 
impulse to move in a necessary direction retain full credibility. 
This raises the second question announced above: how shall 
sociology come to terms with development? 
The repeated comparisons, in the preceding, bet\-reen economics 
and sociology could appear to imply the suggestion that sociology do 
as economics has done. No such suggestion is intended. There is not 
enough real parallelism between the two to vmrrant the expectation 
or desire that the one follovi the example of the other. It seems more 
realistic to anticipate that sociology \'I'ill work its O\ffl access. 
Also in respect of economics there are certain considerations that 
would support such an anticipation. One is the increasingly visible 
rift between econometrics and institutional economics. To the outsider 
this appears as a possible symptom of approaching fundamental diffi-
cul ties in the eoonomists' dealings , .. i th development. In other words, 
by imitating the economist, the development sociologist might be hea-
ding for trouble ultimately, like that \-I'hich seems to be in store for 
economics. This fear is strengthened i~ it is imagined that in follow-
ing; economics, sociology might have to establish its own pars pro 
toto reasoping according to which development would be the same as 
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societal development, or something to this effect. ll'or one thing, it 
is dubious, to say the least, that t.his construct - the sole theoreti~ 
cal prop supporting the virtual monopoly of economics in matters of 
development ~ can outlast ano'ther Development Decade. The considera-
tion that extra-economic or non~eCOnOml(; matters are i:l"~ernal affairs 
~o the developing countries and thus out of bounds to international 
development a.ction, is wearing thin for various reasons. For another 
matter, it seems impossible for sociology to support this type of 
J22;.:uLpro -toto reasoning, given the fact that it is devoid of an ac-
ce.pted central denominator of reality that determines, once and for 
all, what society is as a categorical notion and what, consequently, 
d.cvelopment can beo 
There ~s consolation, indeed hope, in the realization that for 
sociology these several drawba.cks and dead alleys might conceivably 
add up to constituting the advantage of the late-comer: - cherished 
notion of many a dev~lopment worker. 
In considering what sociology might dp about development it is 
proper to take into account, firstly, what is expected, perhaps even 
demanded, of it. The point in so doing, is that the demand is bound 
to be specific to the present period. It could hardly be the same 
a.s the demands made upon science, or for that matter upon economics, 
when these faced their respective challenges~ original demands that 
have been subject to some modification but that have not disappearedo 
A summary comparison will clarify. Engineering and technology, man's 
supreme tools in mastering his context, began, and to an extent still 
feature basically, as fall-out' from science. On the other hand, in 
economiCS, the application of theory has never really rated as a me~ 
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second or secondary consideration. Pure theory and the application of 
theory rate on a par. Few people are thrilled by pure economic theory 
in the manner in which others will delight in p~re science or pure 
mathematics. Sociology, at this writing, is in a different position 
again, Hs theory is expected to be patently a.nd demonstrably rele-
vant to reality. Its supposed raison d'etre is to be available -
that lS, subservient - for controlling or steering social processes. 
The p~oof for this assessment is easy to provide: because it does 
not mee~ these expectations in anything like a convincing manner, 
the discipline has low rating in the eyes of non-initiates and frus-
trates quite a few of its adepts. 
At this point, however, the preache:rs of gloom should bel-lare. 
It lS by no means certain that sociology, in facing the ohallenge, is 
doomed. There is cause for reckoning with the possibility that, pre-
cisely under the pressure of current demands, sociology - if it is 
not to succumb and vanish - will be compelled (and also, for sheer 
lack of solidity, prove able) to relinquish a good deal of the 
shakles of ir~erited thinking. As noted, its central conception of 
societal or sociocultural reality is by no means clear or definite. 
This vitium ori~inis may prove a virtue once the discipline would 
manage to converge upon a common ba.sic conception: one that would 
not merely be common but at the same timo prove a fitting one in the 
llght of current demand. As soon as that were to ha.ppen, the .muddled 
past will be obscured a.nd forgotten; indeed the history of the dis-
ciplino will be written anew. 
To indicate a bright perspeotive of this sort would be a. vain 
aot of pure f~nt,aDY, were it not for certain tondenoies that may be 
read as symptoms of an omergent trend. There are siens that oould in-
dicute an emergent trend to onviBl1~~ reality as meaningful interaction 
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between variably defined entities12 • Pa-rt of this budding awareness 
implies the need, and perhaps the readiness, to subst'i tute intersub-
jectivity as a key concept for the inherited subj~ct-object dichotomy 
(which in its turn 'was representative 'of western 'man fS effort 'at maxi-
mal, subjective mastery of man over context). A further implication, 
specifically referring to intellectual effort and discipline, is the 
perception and appreciation of anyone discipline of the mind as an 
aspect-wise approach, necessarily limited, to the cqmprehensiveness 
of reality. The way concepts and theories are sprouting, it is no 
simple matter to identif.y this trend. After all, no new theory has a 
chance to be considered, let alone accepted, that does not carr,y the 
hallmark of seriousness in the form of a backlog of inherited thinking. 
On the other hand, if exchange theory and Eystems theory - to mention 
two random examples - be considered apart from the inherited ballast 
that serves as their legitimation, it is possible to recognize them 
as two, more or less complementary, moves in the direction just fore-
seen. 
So much is already clear, that a sociology with these fairly 
novel characteristics would have no problems like those ensuing from 
the ~rs pro toto philosophy, exposed in the preceding. In the same 
manner, the inherited drawbacks, exposed in their 'turn, that hamper 
sociologists in their attempts to 00me to terms with rapid overal.l 
change and especially with development, \<lOuld no longer apply 13. 
It is time to return to the question that the sociologist 
must answer with respect to development. Can his discipline be coun-
ted upon to make a dent into the matter? If yes, at which point (or 
points), and how? 
As arzuecl, it appearo that an affirr!1ativ'e ansv:or to this ques-
tion is conditional upon the correctness of the assumption ventured 
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above, namely that the discipline is going through a metamorphosis, 
partly in response to this very challenge. In case the assumption 
would prove mistaken, it seems unlikely that a sa.tisfactory answer 'tT 
would be forthcoming before long. "'; 
In soanning the horizon for possibilities, it is natural that 
more than one approach would appear open to sociology in its effort 
to oome to grips with development. At the same time it is likely that 
some putative approaches will appear which, upon closer scrutiny, will 
prove mere temptations into fruitless effort. It is now proposed to 
enumerate three examples of the former and one,of the latter kind. 
The three possible access roads that appear worth mentioning 
here refer to (1) the unit of development, (2) the modalities of the 
u~ge towards development and (3) control over and involvement in 
development. The one illustration of dead alleys will refer to model 
building. 
As regards'the unit of development, a new wind has begun to 
blow. Sociology may oonceivably catoh some of it in its sails. 
Hitherto there has existed something like a tacit oonsensus to 
the effeot that the nation-state - or, as some have pointedly rephrased 
it, the state-nation - is the one natural unit of development. Eoono-
mists have readily, and without much evidenoe of argumentation, treat-
ea~ the economy and the state as virtually synonymous. They have no 
doubt been induced to do so by the ciroumstance that available data 
and available instruments for decision making and policy implementation 
referred equally to both. Sociologists, in follo'V/ing suit, have found 
additional reason for doing so in the tide of nationalism that aocom-
panied decolonization, this in its turn appearing as the main event 
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ushering in development problems. Thus they have been somewhat at a 
loss \-lhen reminded of things like the /·iarxian distinction between state 
and society. Indeed, as true adherents to the already mentioned under-
lying adjustment philosophy, a number of sociologists have taken the 
nation-state as a datum and started ~~rk from there: witness the spate 
of studies on nation-buildin~, national integration, national elites, 
even national accounting. 
There are increasingly visible signs that the nation-state is 
subject to diminishing returns, both as an analytic concept and as a 
functioning proposition. It is beginning to prove unsatisfactory in 
respect of manifest needs 14.Upon further consideration, this need 
cause no surprise. From a viewpoint of culture history, it is just 
another manifestation of the optimal sociocultural unit: a basically 
incidental matter15 • 
This is not to suggest that the, nation-state is on the \-my out. 
But it does indicate that it is hardly advisable to put all our eggs 
into this one basket. In economics, regional development is beginning 
to take converts away from national development. In sociology, the 
champions of community development have always held out - too entren-
ched no doubt, and with weak theoretical armament - against those 
dedicated to macro development[tl phenomena. This trend toward diver-
sificatibn is to be welcomed. But diversification will not help if the 
several entities or units identified remain mutually isolated proposi-
tions. There is a need to open a broad, general inquiry into the na-
ture and characteristics of the sociocultural unit - more accurately: 
units - that will feature as development propositions. Thus phrased, 
this need shows two dimensions. It refers to the plurality and varia-
bili ty of units, 'in terms of order o'f rnat~i tude and in terms of main 
features, as possibly one broad spectrum. It also refers to the mutual 
definition that is bound to ooour between development as process and 
unit of development. The latter one is a most profoun.d issue. The 
fundamental significa.nce of development, as symptomatic for a orucial 
shift in the parameter of human existence on earth, has been pointed 
ou-t above. It means little less than that to an extent (which remains 
to be ascertained) the cruoial features of the human collectivity are 
being remade or at least reshuffled. Henoe the impossibility "lio conti-
nue along the u-lell-established lines of what has just been described 
as adjustment sociology. Henc8 j again, the patent possibility to turn 
a new page. 
A second topio on which sociology may offer a significant oontri= 
bution is the modaUties of the urge towards development. It has just 
been suggested that "lihere is bound to occur mutual definition, to an 
extent, between development 011 the one hand and human colleotivity 
on the other: not categorically but rather as between an instanoe 
of the OEO andal1. instcUlce of "bhe other. 'rhere are a number of fac-
toi's . or oo:nsiclerai;ions "Ghat ple.y },nt:o this mutuality of perspeotive 
ancltb.a:i.; in so doing ,\oii.ll gi'f8 ~~t a speoifio hue. It is oust omary 
to sum them up in on() c[3,tch="all -Germ~ namely goals. Goals~ i.n their 
. s:t lesst generall~y (in the sense "Ghat beyond a !!l1:11atis mu~~ cla.u.se 
no c<:l,ui;ion h'as cLue in d"ist~:(J.gL1.ishing goals in one situation from those 
ih anothe:r-) .. 'J:11e (usuaJ.l;y i:n.pliei t) i}£t.sis for so much assuming I,ras a, 
oombination of (1) (3,prio:dstic definition of development with (2) 
"8thnocentrism 1 .- both of 1irhiGh have been exposed in the preceding as 
110"~ really tenable 0 .'l'11e GonSeC[LlenOe of exposing them is that ~ ai, thj .. s 
point? there is need for a sijatement to the effect that the matter of 
development goals requires to be approaohed in a ne",r 1 much more ciroum~ 
sped; ma1'l...ner. 
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The required. effor+. nas two main componentl!3o First, the iden.ti-
fication of development goals vlill need renewed care 16 e Most proba.bly 
it will have to encompass rather more aspects than are customarily 
taken into considerationo In thus being more catholic it will not 
I~,j 
mer~ly have to avoid exclusive t~cusBing, in pars pro .toto style, on 
one or a few allegedly salient. or crucial needs or aims .• On top of 
this,the ever so many tributaries to the development urge that will 
·thus be a.'Ilalytically identified, will have to be syilthes:i.zed into a 
oonsistent and workable piotureo A picture that, surely, is bound ~o 
differ from one unit of development to the next. 
The second part of the needed effort is to identif.y the variable 
distribution of component elements of the development urge: first, as 
between oomponents of a "population" constituting a given unit of devel-, . 
opment and, secondly~ as regarQs the manner in which one unit interacts 
with another (whether in juxtapositicn or in the manner that one is 
a component of the other)o 
It bears repeating tha.t work on the nature and characteristics 
of the unit of development and vlOrk on the specificities. of the devel--
opment urge constitute a mutuality of perspectives, for purposes of 
(sociolcgical and other) lLnderstanding as well as for purposes of 
ateering actual developmentso It is this very consideration that in-
vokes the third. matter in respect of which sociology appe~rs to have 
a calling, namely contrcl over and involvement in development. These 
are the phenomena that bes.tow life upon anything that could occur 
,,,here development unit instances deve lopment urge 0 
In any development situation (iike in any other situation but 
perhaps a trifle more emphatically so), the people concerned will be 
involved a.t len.st in the sense tha.t they undergo, and get some share 
in: t.he develo:r,'rilen+.. N:my of them 'diD be involved, n.ddi'tional.ly! in 
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that they will atl;empt to influence, steer or control development. In 
either case, development as an overall process, ~., as the spcific 
condition of the human collectivity concerned, is more comprehensive 
than either variant of involvement. The former could be described as 
a partial experience and the latte~ ~S the exertion of a partial im-
pact: but in either variant those concerned will be naturally tempted 
to adopt a,£ars pro toto interpretation vlhen relating their ovm limit-
eddexperience or role to the comprehensive reality to which it refers. 
The actual manifestation of these two kinds of involvement ap-
pears as a broad spectrum of phenomena, some of which may not even 
appear related at a first blush. By way of a crude approximation, 
they may be summed up under three headings. One complex may be in-
voked by a combination of the terms power and information. An~ther 
can be suggested by a triad of concepts, namely communication, parti-
cipation and collectivization. The third would reside somewhere in 
the field of tension between innovation and c?nservation; health, 
wealth and: secu;rity would appear as key concepts in the connection .. 
The most crucial manifestation of the first resides in insti-
tutionalized pOvler, often of the state, yet wielded - according to 
one formula or another - by a specific category of people over all 
or most others in the unit concerned. Reco@lized conditions of devel-
opment will appear to legitimize tlle stepping up of power and power 
exertion but will render power exertion more difficult at the same 
time. Almost equally crucial as a manifestation, but usually cons i-
dered as being of a more long-run nature, is control over the course 
that development 'flill take. Mostly this is considered piecemeal: 
planning and policy making are distinguished from policy implementa-
tion. Something that is not usually considered in the connection, but 
that is of outstanding importance, is that control in its several 
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aspects connotes the underlying conception, of those concerned, as 
to their spatiotemporal universe. Differences, in this regard, between 
one culture context and another or between one sector of a population 
and another, are too often neglected, and the fines paid in conse-
'-.. 
Quence - in lost opportunities and op,herwise - must b~ immense. In 
its turn, the nature and distribution of information, amongst all 
those concerned, is a major determinant of development possibilities. 
In the case of those characterized by the exertion of power or control, 
it shapes up, inter alia, as feed-back: more critical under development·. 
conditions than in most other circumstances. It is also to be remem-
bered, in this connection, that any privileged access to information 
is a potential source of power. 
The matter of information introduces the second complex: any 
unit of development will feature as a unit on the strength of com-
munication: both internal and acrOss the lUlit's bounda.ries. i'lhat is 
more, the nature and the intensity of c6mmlUlication will be the two 
main determinants of the characteristics of the unit concerned. This 
consideration is the more important since development is, amongst 
other things, a matter of increased (and - complicating factor -
increasingly mediated) communication. A major expression of communi-
cation, and one that is quite amenable to institutionalization, is 
'participation, ~., the effective partaking by any member of a 
given sociocultural entity in matters involving a plurality of mem-
bers, a fortior.i all of them: the realm of public affairs. A crucial 
consideration, in this connection, is wh~re lies the natural limit 
(by the standards of those concerned) to such participation, forair:t 
given purpose: whether within the boundaries of the unit concerned, 
coterminous with it, or perhaps beyond its ·boundaries .• Another con-
sideration refers, obviously, to the nature and definition· of the 
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concern or complex of concerns to which the participation relateso 
One of the ways in which communication and ensuing participation be-
come expressed in societal terms is collectivizationo The unit that 
, ./!'" 
hasp in the preceding, been referred to most of the time as were it 
a given, is in fact the resultant, one way or another, of collectivi= 
zation. As stated above, development and unit of development will to 
an extent define one another mutually. What remains to be added ~~ 
:;f 
this point is that a tendency to collectivize at the expense of 
the self-assertion of components (whether individuals or groups) i.s 
likely to result from certain notable corollaries of developmento 
Some of these are internal to given development units, for example 
nationalism and increased control by authoritieso Others refer to 
the world-wide situation of which development is one sympton v such 
as the frictions resulting from the dogma of sovereign:t.y for any and 
every state. 
It is part of the current conception of sociocultural reality 
to distinguish analytically between two simultaneous, co~~tervailing 
tendencies, one towards innovation and one towards conservationo The 
labels differ a great deal but the basic conception is fairly commono 
There are relatively many who, on the basis of this definitional 
standpoint, will envisage development as the prevalence, if not the 
exclusive vigour, of the former tendency. To them, whatever forces of 
conservation remain will rate as a backlog or as stumbling blockso 
It is somehow puzzling that such a standpoint, based on a blatant 
logical error, should find adherents at all. It should be only too 
obvious that the perception of reality just quoted will admit of one 
approach to development only, namely as a state of affairs where! one 
way or another, the innovative aspect of things gets more of the lime= 
light than the conservative aspect. In the necessary mix between the· 
t\'I10, one ga.ins outfor'theni~inen.t~That being so,. the question is: 
. ;. . 
\'1h1c11 are thenianif~statton-pbints of's~ch· as'tateof .:a.1f~:d"t~ . -A~t~~l 
si tuations all over the world - not meirely in thi:y Ei'o"':called developing 
countries - show a preoccupation with matters like wealth, ~~, 
kno"l"lledge (but this· \-laS discussed ab~:ve, under th:o label of informa-
tion) and, more generally, .~e_curij.rY. A customary label for "bhis sort 
of thing is values; but given all the wear and tear it has had, the 
term seems too tired and worn to render much useful service any moreo 
Nor does it, in its usual meaning, cover exactly the same ground as 
the concepts just enumerated. Hhat matters in regard to·each .of them 
is that their uneven distribution amongst members of the same socio-
cultural entity is somehow up for revision and that in the process 
their basic meanings are being revised. On both counts, they tend to 
feature at once as incentives for development and as yardsticks by 
"l"lhich to assess achieved development. 
~~us conclUdes a tantalizing tour d'horizon of all the things 
that sociology seems called upon to do in regard to development. It 
should be repeated, at this point, that work is actually in progress 
in respect of most of the issues just listed. And it hardly needs re-
peating that much more \vork will be required. The main reason for 
attempting the tour d'horizon is that it might help to lessen. the 
much-beml.ilecl discrepancy between departures and arrivals. It could· 
help to clarify the manner in vlhich all the scat-tered efforts should, 
and might indeed, become cumulative and, hopefully, conclusive. 
Lest this paper end on a undue note of hallelujah - it is much 
too early for that -, one word about vlhat sociology must avoid if it 
ever is to get any¥lhere in respect of development. This is the gran-
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diose scheme, the omnipurpose solution. The most drmgerous Qxample 
of this kind of thing is the development model, preferably quantifiedo 
Al though there probably is no better TtlaY to lose friends and to make 
enemies I the word must be out: the development model is a mirage nOTtI 
I.,.: 
and it will remain so for some time ~o come. A so'cial science that 
h~s not yet found its Copernicus has no cause to clamour for its 
Einstein. 
The development model, whether quantitative or qualitative 
whatever that might mean -, for which the ,demand ~sexplicitly 
underscored bu those inaugurating the Second Develeopment Decade, 
presupposes that development is basically sui generis. Upon closer 
inspection this proves a double presupposition, neither element of 
which, unfortunately enough, is justifiable. ~t assumes that devel~ 
opment is basically the same wherever a developing.:;'; coUntry, area 
or situation is 'identified. It also assumes that development is 
specifically and recognizably different from any other state of 
affairs, indeed ,that it iaan exceptional condition \-1i th readibly 
recognizable limits both in space and in time 0 The, former assumption 
cannot be held up for the simple reason that it involves circular 
definition. The latter can be validated only a~ the price of uphol-
ding a perception and conception of (sociocultural) reality that 
is increasingly under attack on account of its being deemed obsolete 17• 
As if all this were not enough, both the implied assumption that a 
model will enable man to control development once and. for all, and 
again the implied assumption that quantification is crucial to the 
achievement of efficacy, are liable to come lmder exactly the same 
kind of attack. The outcry for the development model is the fina1 
gasp of an approach to development that scholarship is obliged to 
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replace, during tho Second Development Decade, by an approach that 
had better be considerably less frustra-Ung to all concerned. 
The Hague, July 1970. C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijzeo 
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NOT E S 
1 From the viewpoint empioyed here it is .natural to expect a 
nevlly emerging concern, along wi t1i a concept to denote it, of virtual-
ly if not effectively 11orld-wide app'lication. The expectation is not 
j .. ~ 
borne out. The concern l is' no doubt traceable, but its global nature 
e.scapes many. lfuis is due to the absence of a global concept to ren-
der it visible. Some \1ill speak of development as a problem that, one 
way or another, occurs everyvlhere. But the term is mostly used with 
reference to specific parts o;f the Ivorld only" It refers to the under-
developed or developing areas, not to the d~veloped.ones. Nor does 
it have· a counterpart that would naturally convey the same basic· 
meaning v'li th reference to the latter. It could lrlell be that the 
demand for such a complementing concept is scimelvhatobli tera'ted by 
the circumstance··: that at least part of the matter involved is hidden 
from sight. The concept o;e development aid, in seeming lioestablish 
the linkage behleen the developed and the underdeveloped sections of 
mankind, obfuscates an equally important consideration, namely that 
it refers to one aspect or symptom of the same basic concern just 
mentioned, as experienced in the so-called developed areas. 
2 Upon closer inspection, development is one of two counter-
poised symptoms. The other, which is complementary to i"t whilst 
being in many vlays its logical opposite (and, notable fact, more 
visible in the developed, "than in the developing sections of mankind), 
is the urge to drop out of society: \·Ihether individually by self-des-
tructive means such as moral-sexual depravation or drug addiction or 
·collectively by politico-economic subversion and the like. Note that 
some of the major movements in the advanced countries, such as 
social protest and the ecological scare, represent a virtually in-
extricable combination of the "negative" urge signalled in this foot 
note and the "positive" urge (called development in the developing 
areas and virtually nameless in the developed ones) signalled in the 
I 
text above. 
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3 Arnold lJ.'oynbee,.The Horld [md. the. iVeat, London (.Oxford U.P.) 
1953, p. 68 ff. 
4 Lester B. Pearson ~., Partners in Development, Report of·the 
Commission on International Developm·~!).t, NeVI York (Praeger) ·1969~ 
.: 
5· United nations, Lconomic and Social Council, 47th Session, 
Resolution 1447(XLVII) of 7 August 1969. United Nations, General 
Assembly, 24th Session, Resolution 2571 (XXIV), of 29 December 1999. 
6 A fascinating matter, especially if considered in. terms of' cul-
tural history. l'iestern civilizn.tion has at one time become more or 
less unique ~ ~ different from what J. Romein has called the 
Common Human Pattern -, inter alin. by a, segnenting perception of 
reality. For purposes of conceptualization n.nd of subsequent action, 
it rendered tho experienced totality and comprehensiveness of reality 
manageable by purposely and systematically taking it piecemeal. This 
segmentatibnh coupled to the urge tOvTards conflict resolution" is 
part of the creative impulse underlying western development; it also 
has engendered some of the more vital problems of ,,,estern civiliza-
tion. Be this as it may, M~rxian, Marxist and neo~larxistJ. economo-
cratic philosophies constitute a graduallY'more effective attempt to 
revert to a more totalistic or holistic perception of reality, star~ 
ting out 1-lhat what is indubitably a partial, segmentary, conceptuali-
zation. In these and similar philosophies, the-pars pro toto model 
serves as a device not so muoh for conoeptualization as for intended 
human action in respect of reality. 
7 Nor is desire - or, for that matter, need - the only relevant 
consideration. 1I1anifest conoern is yet another. Using this as a 
oriterion, it is hard to uphold the primacy of eoonomic considerations 
for all developing areas of the Vlorld. Indeed there are many areas 
I ' 
Vlhere political matters (questions about the nature and institutiona-
lization of the polity in t4e first place) or cultural self-renewal 
or self-realization catch the limelight (if perhaps not the head-
lines of western news media). 
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8 Hote that this statement goes far beyond the customary objec .... 
tions against the primacy of economics in development theory and 
policy. These rightly - turn against any non-economic approaches 
being relegated to secondary status or subservient role. It is a neces-
sary sobering exercise, at this point, to state that the act of exor-
,;/' 
cizing "economocracy" is a negntion and that it is not easily folloi-led 
up with something more positive or constructive. For example, to say, 
as against the economists, that development is really a matter of 
changing values and attitudes is useless and meaningless. It is 
conceptual play with no pay-off: it merely substitutes one Ears 
pro toto for another and chances are that it is not even a better 
one. 
9 It should be unfortunate and highly undesirable if this concern, 
v1hic11 no doubt is one of the major factors in the emergent anta-
gonism betHeen the so-called sociological establishment and the self-
proclaimed sociological radicals, Here to be obfuscated in the process 
in which this rift is becoming articulated. Unfortunately, at this 
writing the tendency for either side seems to be to become entrenched 
in positions where the crucial problems of relevance and verifiability 
need not be raised. Hhen radicals Nill decry the establishment as 
"do-nothing" the' natural rebuttal is "know-nothing", and basta. 
10 Nonetheless there are few indications, if any, that this prompted 
a critical revie," of basic presuppositions. Comp. my Social Scientists 
in Pursuit of Social Change, The Hague (Bouton) 1966. 
11 Compo E.H. Hofstee, "De toekomst van de Nederlandse samenleving", 
in Hegwijzers naar con goed be"l'lOonbaar Nederland, Beschouwingen ( ••• ) 
V ink , Alphen a.d. Hijn (Samson) 1967, p. 1 - 42, esp. p. 9. 
12 The main definitional feature of sociocultural entities would 
have to be that most forgotten yet most crucial sociological c.oncept: 
identity. The tacit presupposition in any defini tion's and discussions 
of groups, society and many more, it is normally left in the dark. 
lriere it to be highlighted - as seems inevitable.· - in the course of 
the develppments here foreseen lit , .. ould in all probability appear 
as a complex affair, - more exactly, as a proposition involving 
logical complementarity. Identity is, at once, self-assertion 
vis-a.-vis (yet regardless of) context, and intqractioll li/i til context. 
Consequently, varieties of identity will reflect modalities of this 
tvlO-pronged life process. 
13 Some will feel induced to \'lOnder whether in pointing out 
the prospect of such major changes the writer may either be preaching 
revolution unawares (fairly naive, for a sociologist) or alternative-
ly trying to misrepresent an actual revolution by depicting it as a 
mere gradual overhaul (v/hatever that could be). The. answer is that 
the question is unimportant, indeed irrelevant, being a mere product 
itself of undue polarization in sociological opinion. 
14 Both internal to the states concerned (the state, especially 
the welfare state and the development state, functioning as the 
monopolist of welfare/development, and consequently as the virtual 
"owner" of its citizens - or rather, subjects - and even more con-
spicuously of alien residents) and. external as between states (the 
world pattern of sovereign states, exemplified and institutionalized 
in the United nations, as virtually impotent, at crucial points, in 
regard of needed interaction between components of mankind). Natio-
nalism, the alleged prime base of the nation-state, is increasingly 
an instrument in the hands of \·lielders of state power. 
15 
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